Examining three flexible inflation targeting strategies, we find that a small concern for real exchange rate stability as a policy goal matters. First, it warrants the inclusion of the real exchange rate in Taylor rules and, second, it is sufficient to improve the performance of Taylor rules relative to optimal policy. Gains are substantial for domestic and REX inflation targets because a small weight on real exchange rate fluctuations makes optimal policy less aggressive. The gains under CPI inflation targeting are considerably lower.
Simple interest rate rules, often termed Taylor rules, have been used frequently to describe the implementation of monetary policy in closed economies. Before the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, central banks were typically viewed as responding to inflationary pressure and an overheating economy. The vagaries of financial markets since the crisis have, however, heightened the concern for financial stability. Greater awareness of the dangers of distorted asset prices and financial imbalances has produced more recent specifications of Taylor-type rules that include asset prices, interest rate spreads or credit aggregates.
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A discussion of Taylor-type rules for small open economies in the current environment raises the question of whether monetary policy should respond to the (real or nominal) exchange rate. In the past, the case for including an exchange rate argument in simple interest rate rules for monetary policy has been weak. With the exception of economies characterized by financial fragility or dominated by the foreign sector , most of the literature supported the view of Taylor (2001, p.266) and Taylor and Williams (2011) that either there are small performance improvements from reacting to the exchange rate or that such reactions can make performance worse.
2 Two sets of developments suggest the need to revisit this issue.
The first is the emergence of a new generation of open-economy macroeconomic models in which the real exchange rate plays a more fundamental role. The earlier generation of models, for example, the models in Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Gertler (2001, 2002) had the implication that optimal monetary policy in the open economy was isomorphic to policy in the closed economy. This suggested that the Taylor rule for an open economy might not need to be extended beyond domestic inflation and the output gap.
The isomorphism is a distinctive feature of models where the Phillips curve has no direct real exchange rate channel. The real exchange rate affects domestic inflation only indirectly 1 In fact, an extensive debate about the response of monetary policy to developments in asset markets began at the turn of the millennium. Cecchetti et al. (2000 Cecchetti et al. ( , 2002 were in favor of rules that respond to financial asset prices while Gertler (1999, 2001) were opposed. For a recent overview of the debate see Kaefer (2014) . More generally on the issue of reconciling financial stability with other macroeconomic goals, see Leeper and Nason (2015) , Vredin (2015) , Smets (2014), and Woodford (2012) . 2 Empirical evidence cited by Taylor and Williams (2011) came from 1990s open economy econometric models. Their view receives support from studies within New Keynesian models. Examples are Batini et al. (2003 and Leitemo and . Garcia et al. (2011) find that inclusion of the level of the real exchange rate in a Taylor-type rule increases the variability of inflation and the output gap. They do, however, find that smoothing the real exchange rate helps reduce financial volatility without adding to inflation or output variability.
through its effect on the output gap. A later generation of models extends the role of the real exchange rate. Imported inputs (Monacelli (2013) ), incomplete exchange rate pass-through (Monacelli (2005) ), and concern about foreign competitiveness as a factor in firm pricing (Froyen and Guender (2017) ) all suggest direct exchange rate effects in the Phillips curve. In models with a real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve the importance of the real exchange rate in the optimal target rule for monetary policy depends on the underlying inflation objective.
The recent literature also suggests that openness raises questions about the central bank's inflation objective. Allsopp, Kara and Nelson (2006) favor CPI inflation targeting. Kirsanova, Leith, and Wren-Lewis (2006) and others support the earlier studies cited above in advocating a domestic rather than a CPI inflation objective. Froyen and Guender (2017) , following Ball (1999) , consider a real-exchange-rate-adjusted (REX) inflation target similar to core inflation measures employed by some central banks.
Recent papers such as Corsetti et al. (2011) and Monacelli (2013) Woodford's (1999) timeless perspective defined for each of these inflation objectives.
Our most important findings can be briefly summarized here. Even a small weight on real exchange rate stability is sufficient to affect materially the performance of Taylor-type rules relative to the benchmark optimal policy. Gains are substantial particularly for domestic and REX inflation targets because even a small weight on real exchange rate fluctuations in the loss function inhibits the aggressive use of the policy instrument under optimal policy. As real exchange rate stability is a built-in feature of a CPI inflation objective, the gains under a CPI rules and how they compare to optimal policy. A conclusion is offered in Section 5.
INFLATION OBJECTIVES IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
The focus of this paper is a comparison of the performance of simple Taylor 
A. A Small Open Economy Model
The model consists of four equations which are briefly described below. Equation (1) is an open-economy Phillips curve that features a real exchange rate channel in addition to the standard output gap channel. Equation (2) is an open-economy IS relation with a real interest rate and a real exchange rate channel. A foreign output shock and an idiosyncratic domestic shock also affect the demand for domestic output. Equation (3) is the linearized uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition: apart from a stochastic risk premium ( ) agents are assumed to trade in a frictionless international bond market. More formally, the stochastic disturbances are modeled as follows:
All foreign variables are exogenous independent random variables. Finally, equation (4) describes the relationship between the CPI inflation rate, the domestic inflation rate, the real exchange rate, and consumption openness (γ) under perfect exchange rate pass-through. In the first strategy we consider, the rate of inflation is defined in terms of changes in the level of domestic prices. The explicit objective function that the central bank attempts to minimize is given by:
9 Examples are Taylor (2001) , Aoki (2001) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001) . 10 With either specification, our approach is to assume that the central bank decides on (or is assigned) a set of objectives. The alternative is a utility-based endogenous loss function. The latter approach has much to recommend it in optimal policy analysis though each approach has pitfalls (cf. Blanchard (2016) , Sims (2012) , Walsh (2005) and with specific reference to Taylor rules Woodford (2001))). The approach here, where a Taylor rule is compared with optimal policy within a given flexible inflation targeting framework, seems better suited to the evaluation of simple rules, the underlying rationale for which lies with traditional central bank objectives. It is also the approach taken in almost all of the previous literature evaluating the role of the exchange rate in Taylor rules.
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 is the discount factor and  represents the relative weight the policymaker attaches to the squared deviations of the rate of domestic inflation from target. In a similar vein, is the relative weight accorded to the squared realizations of the real exchange rate.
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To reduce the dimension of the central bank's domestic inflation targeting strategy to one involving three choice variables, we need to take two additional steps. First, substitute for the rate of CPI inflation in equation (2). Second, substitute the UIP condition into the IS equation.
The optimization problem can then be expressed as:
s. t.
Combining the first-order conditions yields the endogenous target rule. Under policy from a timeless perspective, the target rule is complex. The model is therefore solved numerically.
Targeting CPI Inflation
If the focus of policy rests on CPI inflation, then the policymaker minimizes
subject to the constraint which is represented by the model economy. After rewriting the structure of the economy in terms of the CPI inflation rate, we can restate the policy objective as:
As in the case of domestic inflation the target rule for CPI inflation under policy from a timeless perspective proves complex and is therefore not reported. The variances of the endogenous variables are again determined by numerical solution.
3. Targeting Both the current and expected change in the real exchange rate appear on the right-hand side of the Phillips curve (equation (1)), which can be rewritten as
as the domestic rate of inflation purged of the real exchange rate effect allows us to rewrite the original open-economy Phillips curve as
Written in this form, equation (10) (10) pertains to the definition of the rate inflation.
The remaining two equations of the model can be rewritten in terms of the real-exchange-rateadjusted rate of inflation:
After substitution of equation (12) into equation (11) to eliminate the nominal interest rate, the optimization problem of the policymaker can be stated as:
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Solving the optimization problem yields the target rule under REX inflation targeting:
It is evident that the systematic relationship between the target variables depends on demandside characteristics of the model economy: the denominator of the coefficient on the change in the real exchange rate depends on γ, a1 and a2. Together with δ these parameters determine the relative importance of the real exchange rate in the target rule. 13, 14 Combining equation (14) with equations (10) - (12) 
EVALUATION OF SIMPLE INTEREST RATE RULES
This section evaluates Taylor rules relative to optimal policy in flexible inflation targeting regimes for each of the three inflation objectives, as set out in the previous section.
Simple Taylor rules will generate greater losses than the optimal policy for two general reasons: first the simple rule responds only to realized values of the target variables -not to the underlying shocks -and second, the coefficients, while chosen to be sensible, are arbitrary. 16 We examine how these relative losses vary with the chosen inflation objective and with the role given to exchange rate stability as a policy objective and/or argument in the Taylor rule.
Initially the targeting regime includes only the goals of inflation and output stabilization.
No weight is put on the variability of the real exchange rate (δ=0). A response to the real exchange rate may still improve the performance of Taylor rules because in the model in Section 2 it has information content with respect to the other central bank objectives. Next, we allow for central bank concern with exchange rate volatility albeit with a small weight relative to the typical elements of the dual mandate (δ=0.1, δ=0.2).
17
To start, we evaluate the performance of Taylor's original rule:
R is the interest rate; π i is the chosen inflation measure (i = domestic, CPI or REX inflation); and y is the output gap. The coefficients are set at the values suggested by Taylor: τπ = 1.5 and τy = 0.5.
For each inflation objective we consider how the performance of this standard Taylor rule is affected by adding a response to the real exchange rate (q). The Taylor rule becomes
The value of τq is set at either 0.25 or 0.50. 16 These points have been stressed by Svensson (2003) and Woodford (2001) . In Section 4 we examine Taylor rules with response coefficients that are chosen optimally. 17 The lower relative weight on the real exchange rate in the central bank's loss function accords with Smets' (2014) view whereby price (and output) stability dominate financial stability as final objectives. It also explains why we choose a low to moderate coefficient for the real exchange rate in the Taylor rule.
Next, for each inflation objective we evaluate a variant of the rule where we change the relative weight on the inflation and output objectives. Finally, we consider the implications of central bank concern for real exchange rate volatility (δ > 0). In all cases the Taylor rule is evaluated relative to the optimal policy under commitment from the timeless perspective. Table 1 provides summary information about the parameter values and the distribution of the exogenous shocks used in the numerical calculations.
A. Domestic Inflation
1. The Standard Taylor Rule Table 2 shows results for a domestic inflation target (π). Panel A is for the standard Taylor rule. In the first column the rule has only the inflation and output gap variables. In the second and third columns the rule includes the real exchange rate (q) with weight of 0.25 and 0.5, respectively. The cells in the table show the variances of all three inflation objectives, the output gap, the real exchange rate (q) as well as the policy instrument (R). Also shown are the value of the loss function (Loss) and the loss relative to the optimal policy (Relative Loss (%)).
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The loss under optimal policy is given in the first column of Panel C of Table 2 (15) or (16) can be improved by increasing the relative weight on output. That this might be the case in our model is suggested by the fact that the main reason why the Taylor rules performance falls short of the optimal policy outcome is the high variance of the output gap.
Panel B explores this possibility by increasing τy from 0.5 to 1.0.
For equation (15), which excludes the real exchange rate, welfare loss relative to the optimal policy falls from 75.9% to 53.9 %. The variance of output declines substantially with only a small rise in the variance of domestic inflation. In the case of equation (16) with the real exchange rate response included, increasing the weight on output is also welfare improving. It is still the case, however, that inclusion of the real exchange rate results in higher welfare loss.
The Real Exchange Rate as Policy Goal
To this point the loss function gives weights only to inflation and the output gap stabilization (δ=0 in equation (5)). The results in Table 2 suggest that concern for exchange rate volatility is important for the evaluation of the desirability of Taylor rules relative to the optimal policy. A comparison of the first column of Panel A with the first column of Panel C reveals that the variance of the real exchange rate (q) under the optimal policy exceeds that under the Taylor rule by 83% for the specification where there is no response to the exchange rate (equation (15)).
The optimal policy is much more aggressive in pursuing the inflation and output goals as can be seen by the much higher variance of the interest rate under this policy. The result is a better outcome for the output goal though not for domestic inflation, but also much more volatility of the real exchange rate.
The last two rows of Panels A and B of Table 2 show the welfare loss from following a
Taylor rule relative to the optimal policy when the real exchange rate is given a weight as a policy goal. The weight on the real exchange rate (δ) is set at 0.1 or 0.2 times the weight on inflation (µ). The weights on inflation and output are then adjusted such that the weights in the loss function sum to 2.0 as before. 20 The comparison here is now to the losses under the optimal 14 policy shown in the second and third columns of Panel C of the to the optimal policy change as we vary the weight on output (τy), the weight on the real exchange rate (τq) and the weight on the real exchange rate in the loss function (δ). The rule with (τy=1.0; τq=0.50; δ=0.2) has a loss of 20.3% relative to the optimal policy. is an aggressive use of the interest rate instrument, resulting in a high variance of the real exchange rate if exchange rate stability is not a policy goal (δ=0).
B. CPI Inflation

C. REX Inflation
The Standard Taylor Rule
With Taylor's original rule (τπ=1.5; τy=0.5; τq=0), the welfare loss from following a
Taylor rule relative to the optimal policy is 99.5%, higher than with the other inflation targets ( Panel A, Column 1)). The loss comes mostly from higher output instability. The variance of the output gap under the standard Taylor rule exceeds that under the optimal policy by a factor of 20.
Adding a real exchange rate response worsens the performance of the standard Taylor rule (Panel A, columns 2 and 3). Loss relative to optimal policy rises to 102.2% for τq=0.5.
The Modified Taylor Rule: a Higher Weight on the Output Gap
Panel B of 
D. Comparisons Across Inflation Targeting Strategies and Loss Functions
Table 5 presents comparisons of the relative losses that result from using a Taylor rule in place of the optimal policy from a timeless perspective across the three inflation targeting regimes. Table 6 compares the gains from adding a real exchange rate response to various specifications of the Taylor rule for different specifications of the loss function.
Relative Losses across Inflation Targeting Regimes
Employing the standard Taylor rule instead of optimal policy results in substantial losses for each of the three inflation targets if only output and inflation appear in the loss function. This can be seen from the first row of panel A in Table 5 . This results from the fact that the Taylor rule responds only to realized values of the target variables, not to the underlying shocks, and that the weights in the Taylor rule are set arbitrarily. In the case of targeting domestic or CPI inflation the optimal policy also takes advantage of the information content of the exchange rate.
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The relative losses are largest for REX inflation targeting (99.5%) because in that case the optimal policy can, by responding to the demand-side shock directly, adjust the interest rate to offset its effect. The Taylor rule cannot. The relative loss under CPI inflation targeting is smallest (32.3%). For this inflation objective the optimal policy is least aggressive because adjusting the interest rate with consequent effects on the real exchange rate displaces CPI inflation; thus the optimal policy is closer to the standard Taylor Relative losses from following the Taylor rules decline considerably with these alternative weights. The optimal policy becomes less aggressive when penalized for resulting real exchange rate volatility and comes closer to the behavior of the corresponding Taylor rule.
The relative ranking across the three inflation objectives remains the same. The range of the relative losses, however, is far more compact. Losses relative to optimal policy decrease to 14.3% for CPI inflation, 20.3% for domestic inflation, and 26.4% for REX inflation if policy follows a modified Taylor rule that smooths the real exchange rate.
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Gains from Adding an Exchange Rate Response to the Taylor Rule
Rows 2 and 4 of Panel B in Table 5 show the losses for the Taylor rule relative to optimal policy when a real exchange rate response is added to the rule (τq = 0.5) and the variance of the real exchange rate given a weight in the loss function (δ = 0.2). In Table 6 these losses are compared to the losses of the corresponding Taylor rules without the real exchange rate response (Panel B). Table 6 also shows the gain or loss from adding a real exchange rate response to the Taylor rules if the loss function gives a weight only to inflation and the output gap (Panel A).
In Table 6 , if we confine ourselves to Panel A (δ=0), the results are consistent with Taylor's (2001, p.266 ) description of previous studies: "they seem to be suggesting similar conclusions either that there are small performance improvements from reacting to the exchange rate or that such reactions can make performance worse." Only for CPI inflation targeting with the standard rule and Taylor's original weights is the gain (10.8%) not clearly "small." In the cases of domestic and REX inflation targeting, performance of the Taylor rule deteriorates relative to the optimal policy when a real exchange rate response is added.
The situation is different when the real exchange rate variance is given a weight in the loss function. For each of the three inflation targets the gain is greatest for the higher real exchange rate response (τq= 0.5). Across the three targeting strategies, the gains are highest for CPI inflation targeting: 48.8% for the rule with Taylor's weights and 46.6% with the higher weight on the output gap (τy =1). Gains for the other two inflation targets are between 28% and 30%. If an even smaller weight is chosen for real exchange rate variance (δ = 0.1) such that the scaled weight (0.09524) comprises less than 5% of the sum total (2) of the weights in the loss function, adding an exchange rate response to the Taylor rule still appears desirable. For the rule with Taylor's original weights, the gains are 33.5% for CPI inflation, 13.9% for REX inflation and 11.5% for domestic inflation.
What drives the results in Tables 5 and 6 ? With only inflation and the output gap as policy goals, optimal policy from a timeless perspective is very aggressive, resulting in high real exchange rate volatility. The Taylor rule is less aggressive. When the variance of the real exchange rate is also a policy goal, optimal policy takes volatility of the real exchange rate into 20 account and becomes less aggressive. Relative losses from using the Taylor rule are generally lower. Moreover in this case a Taylor rule that smooths the exchange rate is preferred.
RESULTS WITH OPTIMIZED TAYLOR-TYPE RULES
Taylor chose coefficients he believed were sensible but which were not tied to a specific model. Other papers have constructed Taylor-type rules with coefficients chosen to be optimal within a model. Examples within an open economy context are: Garcia, Restrepo and Roger (2011), Leitemo and Söderström (2005) , and Batini, Harrison and Millard (2001) Previous studies have found that, when unconstrained, the optimal response coefficients in Taylor rules have been too high to be economically sensible. These studies have addressed the problem by including the change in the interest rate as a cost in the policymaker's loss function. There are valid reasons that justify interest rate stability as a policy objective. 22 We follow this course. The resulting objective function for the central bank is given below Table 7 .
The real exchange rate only appears for δ > 0. The weight on the interest rate stability argument ( ) is set at 0.1. The Taylor rules are unchanged from those in the previous section (equations (15) and (16)). The parameters are now chosen by joint optimization to minimize the new objective function. Because the objective function has changed the losses are not strictly comparable with those in Section 3.
A. Losses from Optimized Taylor Rules
Panel A of Table 7 shows the parameter values of the optimized Taylor rules without the real exchange rate for each of the three inflation targets. The loss score and relative loss, measured by losses above that of optimal policy from a timeless perspective are also shown.
The first row of the table provides results with δ = 0; the real exchange rate is given no weight in the loss function. The optimized Taylor rules show a stronger response to the output gap than Taylor's original rule (τy=0.5) or the adjusted value (τy=1.0) used in the previous section for each of the three inflation targets. The response to inflation is smaller than Taylor's value (τπ=1.5) for the domestic inflation or REX inflation target but higher for the CPI inflation target.
The pattern of losses relative to the optimal policy is the same as for the Taylor rules in the previous section. Losses for CPI inflation are smallest; those for REX inflation are largest with those for domestic inflation in between but closer to those for REX inflation. All losses relative to the optimal policy are smaller in Table 7A than those for the comparable rules in the previous section. But as noted the losses are not strictly comparable.
The second and third lines of panel A provide results where the central bank objective function includes stability of the real exchange rate. In the case of optimized Taylor rules, coefficients tend to decline as exchange rate volatility is given a larger weight. Optimal policy from a timeless perspective also becomes less aggressive with exchange rate volatility as an added policy goal. In the table the relative losses from using a Taylor rule are lower for the domestic and REX inflation target but higher for the CPI inflation target.
B. Optimized Taylor Rules with a Real Exchange Rate Response
Panel B of Table 7 shows results for optimized Taylor rules when the real exchange rate is added to the rule. The first row of the panel contains results for the case where the rule includes a response to the real exchange rate but the loss function does not give a weight to real exchange rate stability (δ = 0). It is for this case that Taylor (2001) summarized the evidence as pointing to at best a small performance gain when a real exchange rate response is added to the rule. The table indicates no gain when domestic inflation is the target, a gain of 3.3% with the REX inflation target and 13.7% with a CPI inflation target. 23 Only the last case might suggest need for a revision in Taylor's summary of the evidence.
The situation is different when exchange rate stability is a policy goal even with a small weight (δ=0.1, δ=0.2). Results for these cases are shown in the second and third rows of Table   7B . The inclusion of exchange rate stability as a goal results in an increase in the optimal real exchange rate response in the Taylor rule. In a few cases the response to the real exchange rate exceeds the response to the inflation target. The gains to adding a real exchange rate response to 23 The gains are calculated in the same way as those reported in for REX inflation targeting. Even with the smaller weight (δ=0.1), the performance of Taylor rules improves markedly with the addition of a response to the real exchange rate.
CONCLUSION
In our final exercise assessing the losses from using Taylor rules in place of optimal policy from a timeless perspective (the bottom line of open economies that they had to survey in this regard, however, dated from the 1990s, focused on large economies and concentrated on the traditional elements of the dual mandate. 25 Our results are based on a later generation of New Keynesian models in which the real exchange rate has a more fundamental role. This is important. Still, most crucial for the merits of including an exchange rate in the Taylor rules we consider is whether the central bank places a weight on stability of the real exchange rate. It is noteworthy that even with a small weight on real exchange rate stability, inclusion of the real exchange rate results in significant improvement in the rule's performance relative to optimal policy under the timeless perspective. If the dual mandate is expanded to include real exchange rate stability even as a lesser policy goal, as seems sensible given the current turbulence in world financial markets, pessimism concerning the usefulness of including a real exchange rate response in Taylor-type rules is unwarranted.
Table 1: Calibration of Model
The following values for the parameters and variances of the stochastic disturbances are used in the numerical calculations of the variances of the endogenous variables of the model. Some of these were taken from Svensson (2000) . 
Definitions:
Std. TR: = 1.5 + 0. a Gain or loss is measured as the change in the loss relative to the optimal policy under the timeless perspective. The real exchange rate response (τq) is set at 0.25 or 0.5 depending on which minimizes relative loss. For example, for CPI inflation with the loss function containing only π CPI and y, in Table 3 we have: Relative Loss (τq=0) = 32.3% and Relative Loss (τq=0.25) = 28.8%. Thus the gain reported in the table is (32.3-28.8)/32.3 = 10.8%.
